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Abstract
Do runoff elections, using the same voting rule as the initial election but just on
the winning candidates, increase or decrease the complexity of manipulation? Does
allowing revoting in the runoff increase or decrease the complexity relative to just having
a runoff without revoting? For both weighted and unweighted voting, we show that
even for election systems with simple winner problems the complexity of manipulation,
manipulation with runoffs, and manipulation with revoting runoffs are independent, in
the abstract. On the other hand, for some important, well-known election systems we
determine what holds for each of these cases. For no such systems do we find runoffs
lowering complexity, and for some we find that runoffs raise complexity. Ours is the
first paper to show that for natural, unweighted election systems, runoffs can increase
the manipulation complexity.
1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature on two-stage and multistage voting. Although some of this
study exists within economics, multistage elections and runoffs have been greatly influential
in computational social choice during the past decade, due to such work as that of Elkind
and Lipmaa [EL05] and Conitzer and Sandholm [CS06].
Particularly interesting recent work in this line has been done by Narodytska and
Walsh [NW13]. They focus on manipulation of election systems of the form X Then Y ,
i.e., an initial-round election under voting rule X, after which if there are multiple winners
∗Supported in part by NSF grants CCF-0915792, CCF-1101452, and CCF-1101479, and NSF Graduate
Research Fellowship DGE-1102937.
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just those winners go on to a runoff election under voting rule Y , with the initial votes now
restricted to the remaining candidates. The question at issue is whether a given manipu-
lative coalition can vote in such a way as to make a distinguished candidate win (namely,
win in the initial round if there is a unique winner in the initial round, or if not, then be a
winner of the runoff).
Narodytska and Walsh [NW13] study the computational complexity of this question.
They strongly address the issue of how the manipulation complexity of X and Y affect the
manipulation complexity of X Then Y . Viewing P as being easy and NP-hardness as being
hard, they show that every possible combination of these manipulation complexities can be
achieved for X, Y , and X Then Y .
The present paper focuses on the complexity of X Then X. That is, we are focused
on the case where X is so valued as an election system that if X selects a unique winner,
our election is over and we have our winner. However, if X in the initial round has tied
winners, then we take just those winners and subject them to a runoff election, again using
system X. (Votes in this second election will be over only the candidates who made it to
the second round.) Like Narodytska and Walsh [NW13], we are interested in the case in
which the second-round votes are simply the initial-round votes restricted to the remaining
candidates, and the case, first raised by them, in which revoting is allowed in the second
round.
Real-world examples exist of such same-system runoff elections. In general elections
in North Carolina and many districts of California, election law specifies that if there are
two or more candidates tied for being the winner in the initial plurality election, a plurality
runoff election is held among just those candidates [Nor13,Cal13]. (Curiously, in both states
this approach is explicitly limited to general elections. For party-candidate-selection (so-
called “primary”) elections, perhaps to limit cost, both states break ties by lot, and in
addition North Carolina breaks ties by lot if very few voters voted.) So (Plurality Then
Plurality)-with-revoting is being used.
Although Narodytska and Walsh [NW13] for X Then Y elections showed that all com-
binations of P and NP-hardness for X, Y , and X Then Y can be realized, their examples
achieving that almost all have X 6= Y . Thus their broad results do not address the issue of
whether all possibilities can be achieved if one seeks to use the same system for both the
initial and the runoff election.
We show that every possibility can be achieved, even when the runoff is the same system
as the initial election. Indeed, even in the three-way comparison of the complexity of X,
the complexity of X with runoff (under X), and the complexity of X with a runoff (under
X) with revoting, we show that every possibility of setting some or all of those to P or to
NP-complete manipulation complexities can be realized. And we show that this can even
be done while ensuring that the winner problem for X (i.e., determining whether a given
candidate is a winner of a given election under X) remains in P, and can also be done both
for the weighted and the unweighted cases. For example, there are election systems X—
having P winner problems—such that manipulation of X is NP-complete, manipulation
of X Then X is NP-complete, but manipulation of X Then X with revoting is in P.
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And there are election systems X—having P winner problems—such that manipulation of
X is in P, manipulation of X Then X is NP-complete, but manipulation of X Then X
with revoting is in P. Briefly put, there is no inherent connection between these three
complexities.
For the most important systems, however, it is very important to see what the effects of
runoffs, and revoting runoffs are. For example, weighted plurality is easily seen to remain
easy in all of our cases, e.g., manipulation of elections with runoffs, or with revoting runoffs,
remains in P. However, that result itself is something of a fluke. We show that for every
(so-called) scoring protocol that is not Triviality, Plurality, or a disguised version of one of
those, manipulation of elections with runoffs and manipulation of elections with revoting
runoffs are NP-complete. Although manipulation of unweighted veto is in P, we show that
manipulation of unweighted veto elections with runoffs and manipulation of unweighted
veto elections with revoting runoffs are NP-complete. For unweighted HalfApproval (the
scoring protocol where each voter gives one point to his or her ⌈‖C‖/2⌉ top candidates and
zero points to the rest), we prove that for both elections with runoffs and elections with
revoting runoffs, the manipulation complexity, even when restricted to having at most one
manipulator, is NP-complete. This contrasts with the nonrunoff manipulation complexity
of unweighted HalfApproval, which is in P when there is one manipulator (and indeed for
an unlimited number of manipulators, using the argument of [XCP10, Corollary 4.2]).
Both Veto and HalfApproval are natural, unweighted cases where runoffs increase the
manipulation complexity, and are the first such natural, unweighted cases in the literature.
In fact, the previous literature did not find any such natural, unweighted example even if one
is allowed to use different election systems in the first and second rounds. And for weighted
manipulation, we provide the literature’s first natural examples where a same-system runoff
increases manipulation complexity.
For the case of one manipulator, a standard way of seeking to manipulate unweighted
or weighted scoring protocols—pioneered for the unweighted case by Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT89a], and extended in many papers since—is to use the natural greedy algorithm.
However, we prove that for some scoring protocols X, the greedy approach fails on X Then
X.
Since we feel this tool will be useful elsewhere, we mention that Section 4.2 presents a
tool, which we call the AlwaysWinners transformation, that is very helpful in paving over
the chasm caused by the fact that some people feel that the natural way to define the notion
of an election rule is to allow any subset of the candidates to form the winner set, and some
people feel that the natural way to define the notion of an election rule is to allow any
nonempty subset of the candidates to form the winner set. Traditional social choice uses
the latter definition, but many computationally oriented papers prefer the former for its
symmetry. Section 4.2’s AlwaysWinners tool is a construction that transforms an election
system into a new one that will (except when the candidate set is empty) always have at
least one winner. Crucially, the transformation is so tightly related to the original election
system that it leaves unchanged the complexity of many election-attack problems.
3
2 Related Work
There are quite a few papers whose focus is close to ours. Yet each differs in some impor-
tant way. Centrally underpinning our study and framing is the work of Narodytska and
Walsh [NW13] on manipulating X Then Y elections. In a very real sense, our paper is
merely about their diagonal—the case when one uses the same voting system in the original
election and the runoff. However, since they were not specifically exploring the diagonals,
their existence results in general don’t address that case. (However, we must mention an
important exception. They show that for STV′, a particular decisive form of STV, that
STV′ and STV′ Then STV′ are both NP-hard.1) Our constructions, which must work
within a single system for both rounds, are quite different from theirs.
In contrast, the even earlier work of Elkind and Lipmaa [EL05] has a section on using
the same system in each round, which is our focus also. However, their model (unlike
Narodytska and Walsh and unlike our paper, which pass forward just the winners) is based
on removing only the least successful candidate after a round. In particular, their model
is of one or more initial pruning rounds, that in their examples use a “prune off the least
successful candidate” (except in one case they prune off half the candidates) rule inspired by
some election system X, after which there is a final round using some (potentially different)
election system Y . So Elkind and Lipmaa’s section on using the same system even in the
final round (Section 5 of their paper) is about having one or more rounds using (a variant of)
X to cut off the least popular candidate, and then a final round also using X. Other recent
work on removing weakest candidates, usually sequentially, include that of Bag, Sabourian,
and Winter [BSW09] and Davies, Narodytska, and Walsh [DNW12].
Related to the Elkind–Lipmaa work is the still earlier “universal tweaks” work of
Conitzer and Sandholm [CS03], which shows that adding one pairwise (so-called) CUP-like
“preround,” which cuts out about half the candidates, can tremendously boost a system’s
manipulation complexity over a broad range of systems.
Speaking more broadly, the problem that Narodytska and Walsh [NW13] and this paper
are studying, for the case of runoffs and runoffs with revoting, is the manipulation problem.
This asks whether a coalition of manipulators can ensure that a particular candidate is a
winner of the overall election. The seminal work on the computational complexity of manip-
ulation was that of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a] and Bartholdi and Orlin [BO91],
and there have been many papers since studying manipulation algorithms for, and hardness
1To avoid confusing the literature’s terminology, it is important for us to mention that there is a very
slight, but arguably philosophically interesting, difference between the Then we defined in the Introduction
and the Then operator as defined by Narodytska and Walsh [NW13]. Our and their definitions of X Then
Y can differ in outcome only on what happens if there is exactly one winner of the initial election. In our
use of Then (as given in this paper), in that decisive case the election is over. In their case, that one winner
goes on to a one-person election under system Y . Their approach opens the door to having system Y in
some cases kill off a single candidate who won the initial round. However, we stress that in their paper
they absolutely never use that possibility, and so every result in their paper, including each one mentioned
in this paper, holds equally well in both models. Indeed, for any election system that always has at least
one winner when there is at least one candidate, the two models coincide, and almost all natural election
systems have this property.
4
results for, a variety of election systems, see, e.g., the survey [FHHR09]. This entire stream
exists within the area known as computational social choice [CELM07].
Finally, we mention that there is an interesting line of work of Meir et al. [MPRJ10]
and Lev and Rosenschein [LR12] studying in a fully game-theoretic setting iterated voting
in the sense of seeing whether a Nash equilibrium is reached; see also Reijngoud and En-
driss [RE12]. This work does not remove candidates after votes, and so is different in flavor
and goal from our work.
3 Preliminaries
We first give a standard formalization of elections, the winner problem, and the manip-
ulation problem. Each election instance will have a finite set, C, of candidates, e.g., a
particular election might have Obama and Romney as its candidates. Elections also have a
finite collection of votes, which we will assume are input as a list of ballots, one per voter.
Although social choice theory sometimes allows voters to have names, in this paper we
study the most natural case—the one where votes come in nameless, and the election sys-
tem’s outcome depends on just what the multiset of votes is. We will refer to the collection
of votes as V . The type of each vote will depend on the election system. Most systems
require a tie-free linear ordering of the candidates, and that will be the case for all systems
discussed in this paper.
So-called scoring protocols such as Plurality, Veto, Borda, and so on will for us have votes
cast as linear orders. And then from those orders we will assign points to each candidate
based on the rules of that scoring system. For example, in a veto election, each voter casts
zero points for his or her least favorite candidate, and one point for each other candidate.
In a plurality election, each voter casts one point for his or her favorite candidate, and zero
points for each other candidate. In Triviality, each candidate gets zero points from each
voter, and so all candidates tie as winners. In HalfApproval, if there are m candidates,
each voter gives one point to each of the ⌈m/2⌉ top candidates in his or her linear order,
and gives zero points to each other candidate. In any scoring system, all points for each
candidate are added up, and the candidate(s) who have the maximum score achieved by
any candidate are the winner(s). (When we speak of scoring protocols in the abstract, each
scoring protocol must have a fixed number of candidates. However, when we say Plurality
or HalfApproval or so on, we usually are referring to the protocol that on m-candidate
inputs uses the m-candidate Plurality or HalfApproval or so on scoring protocol mentioned
above.) In Copelandα elections [Cop51], where α is a rational number between 0 and 1,
winners are computed as follows. We look at the pairwise election between every pair of
candidates. The candidate that wins gets a point. In case of a tie, both candidates get α
points. The winner(s) are the candidates with the most points. Copeland1 is also known
as Llull [HP01].
An election system, X, is a mapping that given C and V outputs a set of candidates
W (“the winner(s)”). This is precisely the definition of a social choice correspondence, as
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given in Shoham and Leyton-Brown [SLB09].2 All election systems that we construct to
realize claims of our theorems have W 6= ∅ (when C 6= ∅), which in social choice is often
part of the definition of an election system (see also the paragraph immediately before the
start of Section 4.1.1). Our Section 4.2 in fact gives a broadly applicable way of paving
over the difference between having and not having this condition. The winner problem for
an election system X is the language that contains exactly those triples C, V , and p ∈ C
such that p is a winner in the X election on C and V . Although some well-known election
systems exist whose winner problems are not in P [BTT89b], all the systems we study in
this paper have P winner problems.
We now define the classic unweighted and weighted (coalitional) election manipulation
problems, due to Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [CSL07] (generalizing the noncoalitional
unweighted case raised by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a]). The unweighted version,
called Constructive Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation (CUCM), is defined as follows for
any given election system X.
Name: X-CUCM.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V1 of the nonmanipulative votes (each specified
by a tie-free linear ordering over the candidates), a set V2 of manipulative voters (since
our voters do not have names, these are specified by a nonnegative integer input in
unary giving the number of manipulative voters), and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Is there a way to set the votes of the manipulators, V2, so that under the election
system X, p is a winner of the election over candidate set C with the vote set being
the ballots of the manipulators and the nonmanipulators?
The analogous weighted version, X-CWCM, is the same except each member of V1 has
both a weight and a tie-free linear order, and V2 is specified as a list giving the weight of
each manipulator. The allowed range of weights is the positive integers. For each of the
election systems we deal with in a weighted context, it will be immediately apparent what
it means to use the election system on weighted voters.
Our interest here is in runoff elections. So in addition to the above classic versions,
let us define versions with runoffs and with revoting runoffs. The “runoff” problems X-
CUCM-runoff and X-CWCM-runoff are the same as the above problems, except if after
the X election there are two or more winners, a runoff election is conducted under X,
with the candidates being just the winners of the initial election, and the votes of all
voters (both manipulators and nonmanipulators) being their initial-election’s preference-
order vote, restricted to the remaining set of candidates. The “revoting runoff” (or for
2That definition and this paper allow, as do many papers in computational social choice theory, the case
in which an election has no winners. We find that natural for symmetry with the case in which everyone
wins. Also, there are real-world cases in which having no winner is natural, e.g., the system for electing
players to the Baseball Hall of Fame is set up so that if the crop of candidates in a given year is weak no
one will win. That has happened four times, most recently in the January 2013 vote, in which none of the
37 candidates were elected to the Hall.
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short, “revoting”) problems X-CUCM-revoting and X-CWCM-revoting are the same as
the above runoff problems, except if there is a runoff election, the manipulators may change
their votes. And the question is, of course, whether in this setting there is a set of initial-
round and, if needed, second-round manipulator votes that makes p a winner of the overall
election.3
Note that all of these problems are defined as language problems, as is standard in
the area. Typical complexities that they might take on are membership in P and NP-
completeness. Those two cases are the focus of this paper and of most papers in this area.
However, we mention in passing three related issues. First, it has recently been pointed
out that at least in some artificial cases, election decision problems can be in P even when
their related search problems are NP-hard [HHM13]. This worry does not infect any of
this paper’s results. Every result where we make a polynomial-time claim in this paper has
the property that in polynomial time one can even produce the action(s) that achieve the
desired outcome (such as making the given candidate win), i.e., our polynomial-time results
are essentially what is sometimes called “certifiable,” see Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra,
and Rothe [HHR07].4
Second, and on the other end of the complexity range, there has been much worry
about, and some empirical studies suggesting, that perhaps even NP-complete sets can be
often easy. Only during the past half decade has computer science obtained the following
remarkably strong result showing that this cannot happen: If even one NP-hard set has
a (deterministic) polynomial-time heuristic algorithm whose asymptotic error frequency
is subexponential, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses. See the expository article of
Hemaspaandra and Williams [HW12] for a discussion of that result and an attempt to
reconcile it with the good empirical results observed for hard problems. (Even for election
problems, heuristics seem to often do very well, see, e.g., [FP10,RS13].) Our view is that the
issue of proving rigorous results about the performance of heuristics on election problems
is a highly difficult, highly important direction, but that NP-completeness results for a
given problem are unquestionably an excellent indication that p-time algorithms, and even
p-time heuristics with subexponential error rates, cannot be reasonably expected. Thirdly,
3To make this crystal clear, we give an in-math definition of theX-CUCM-runoff notion described in words
above, namely, given C, V1, V2, and p, the question is whether (∃R)[{p} = X(C, V1∪R) ∨ (‖X(C, V1∪R)‖ >
1 ∧ p ∈ X(X(C, V1 ∪R), (V1 ∪R)X(C,V1∪R)))], where the subscript denotes masking those votes down to the
specified candidates, the unions are multiset-like, and R is an assignment of votes to the manipulative voter
set V2. And similarly, X-CUCM-revoting is the same except with the question (and the new variable S is
over assignments of manipulative voters to V2) being (∃R)(∃S)[{p} = X(C, V1 ∪ R) ∨ (‖X(C, V1 ∪ R)‖ >
1 ∧ p ∈ X(X(C, V1 ∪ R), (V1 ∪ S)X(C,V1∪R)))].
4For the case of revoting runoffs, the natural model here, in terms of seeking a polynomial-time certificate-
(i.e., action-) yielding algorithms, is to allow the manipulative coalition, before the runoff election, a full
view of all the initial votes and candidates, and of the outcome of that election, and to require that they
set their votes in polynomial time, and of course to also require that their initial-election vote-setting
be done in polynomial time. However, since all the election systems in this paper have polynomial-time
winner problems, after a given set of initial-round votes the manipulators can themselves compute who the
initial-round winner(s) are, and so for problems with p-time winner algorithms, one can w.l.o.g. require the
manipulative coalition to fork over at the same time both of its rounds of votes.
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we mention that in our model, as is standard in this area, the manipulators are given
access to the votes of the nonmanipulators. This is a strong though standard assumption,
and admittedly is a model for study rather than a perfect image of the real world. The
model actually makes the NP-hardness results stronger (since they say that even with full
information the problem remains intractable) and most of our results are NP-hardness
results.
4 Results
We now turn to our results regarding the complexity of the manipulation problem for
elections, for elections with runoffs, and for elections with revoting runoffs.
Our results are of two basic sorts. First, we are interested in what can happen. That is,
for those three manipulation complexities, what is the relationship between them? Is there
any connection at all?
We show that there is no connection that holds globally. Even when limiting ourselves
just to election systems with P winner problems, we prove that every possible case of P-
or-NP-complete can simultaneously hold for these three complexities: Each of the eight
weighted and eight unweighted possibilities can be realized. The reason we want to know
what can happen is because it is important to know the universe of behaviors that one may
face. Note that since our runoff and revoting problems must have the same system used
in the initial and runoff rounds, the result we mention does not follow from the important
work of Narodytska and Walsh [NW13] realizing all possibilities for X Then Y .5
Our second type of result regards what does happen for the most famous, important,
natural systems. For example, although we show that, perhaps counterintuitively, runoffs
and revoting runoffs can sometimes lower complexity and can have other bizarre relative
complexities, for none of the natural, concrete systems we have looked at do we find this
behavior to occur. For each concrete, natural system we have studied, runoffs and revoting
runoffs either leave the manipulation complexity unchanged, or increase the manipulation
complexity. Of course, our results on what does happen for concrete systems prove some of
the cases of our claims regarding what can happen.
4.1 Realizability Theorem
The following theorem states our result about what can happen, namely, regarding P and
NP-completeness, any possible triple of complexities can occur.
5Our complexity results regarding revoting, which first appeared in a January 2013 technical report on
this work [FHH13], appeared after the 2012 paper of Narodytska and Walsh [NW12] that suggested the
study of revoting but that didn’t provide complexity results on that topic; our complexity results regarding
revoting appeared before the 2013 version [NW13] that has complexity results on revoting; that is, those
results were obtained separately.
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Theorem 4.1 Let NPC denote “NP-complete.” Let W = {(P,P,P),
(P,P,NPC), (P,NPC,P), (P,NPC,NPC), (NPC,P,P), (NPC,P,NPC), (NPC,NPC,P),
(NPC,NPC,NPC)}.
1. For each element w of W , there exists an election system X, whose winner problem is
in P, such that the complexity of X-CUCM, X-CUCM-runoff, and X-CUCM-revoting
is, respectively, the three fields of w.
2. The analogous result holds for the weighted case (where the three fields will capture the
complexity of X-CWCM, X-CWCM-runoff, and X-CWCM-revoting, respectively).
Recall that we promised that each election system that we construct to realize claims
in our theorems will always have at least one winner (if there is at least one candidate).
The election systems that we build in this theorem will satisfy that also. However, along
the path to building such a system X, we will often first build an election system Y that
is allowed to have everyone lose, and that satisfies the theorem in the model where there
is always a runoff, even where there is a unique winner in the initial round. We then set
X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where AlwaysWinners is as described in Section 4.2. Then X,
which always has at least one winner (when there is at least one candidate), also satisfies
the conditions of the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff. And since X
always has at least one winner, X also satisfies the conditions of the theorem in our standard
model, where when there is a unique winner in the initial round, this candidate is a winner
of the overall election and there is no runoff.
4.1.1 Unweighted Cases of the Realizability Theorem
We briefly mention that the two most interesting unweighted cases in the realizability
theorem are the ones realizing the cases (NPC,P,NPC) in Theorem 4.7 and, especially,
(NPC,NPC,P) in Theorem 4.10. The key twist in these is that both create a setting in
which an election system can in effect pass messages to its own second-round self through
the winner set and with the help of the manipulators. In particular, in a certain set of
circumstances, the election system can be made to, in effect, know that “If the input I’m
seeing is taking place in a second round (although I cannot myself tell whether or not it is),
then we are utterly certainly in a model in which revoting is allowed and indeed in which
one of the manipulators has changed his or her vote since the initial round.”
We now present the proofs of the eight unweighted cases of Theorem 4.1. Most of the
constructions used in these cases make use of the function f(·) described below.
Definition 4.2 Let f(·) denote the number of candidates needed so that an ordering over
f(ℓ) can express clearly at least ℓ possibilities. So f(ℓ) can be taken to be the least integer
k such that k! ≥ ℓ.
Theorem 4.3 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such that
X-CUCM, X-CUCM-runoff, and X-CUCM-revoting are all NP-complete.
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Proof. As mentioned earlier, Narodytska and Walsh [NW13] show that STV′-CUCM and
STV′-CUCM-runoff are NP-hard, where STV′ is the decisive version of STV where ties are
broken in favor of the manipulators. As pointed out in [NW13], this follows because STV′
= STV′ Then STV′. It is also immediate that STV′ = STV′ Then STV′ (with revoting).
This establishes Theorem 4.3 for X = STV′. ❑
Theorem 4.4 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such that
X-CUCM, X-CUCM-runoff, and X-CUCM-revoting are all in P.
Proof. Let X = Plurality. Since the manipulators want to maximize the plurality score
of their preferred candidate, p, their optimal action is to put p at the top of their orderings.
It does not benefit the manipulators to put any other candidate higher in their orderings
or to change their vote in the runoff. ❑
Theorem 4.5 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such that
X-CUCM is in P and both X-CUCM-runoff and X-CUCM-revoting are NP-complete.
Proof. Let X = Veto. This follows directly from Theorem 4.20, since it is well-known
that Veto-CUCM is in P. ❑
Theorem 4.6 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such that
X-CUCM and X-CUCM-runoff are in P, but X-CUCM-revoting is NP-complete.
Proof. Let f(·) be as specified in Definition 4.2. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y
is defined as follows:
If ‖V ‖ 6= 1 then everyone loses.6
If ‖C‖ = 2 and the lexicographically smaller is ranked above the lexicographically larger
candidate by the voter then everyone wins.
If ‖C‖ ≥ 4, the lexicographically smallest candidate’s name encodes a formula ψ, and
‖C‖ ≥ f(2#vars(ψ)) + 1 (the “+1” is as we’ll not involve the lexicographically smallest
candidate in encoding the assignment), then we do the following. If the voter ranks the
lexicographically largest above the lexicographically smallest candidate and on all candi-
dates other than the lexicographically smallest it codes an assignment that satisfies ψ then
the lexicographically smallest and largest candidates win. Otherwise, the lexicographically
smallest, second smallest, and largest win.
Otherwise, everyone loses.
That completes the specification of Y .
Now we explain why this system Y meets all the requirements of the theorem in the
model where there is always a runoff.
6We could remove the restriction that we have a single voter by always allowing an arbitrary number of
voters, but requiring that all but at most one of the voters cast a vote that encodes a message to ignore
their vote.
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• Clearly the winner problem for Y is in P.
• Y -CUCM is in P since a preferred candidate p can always be made a winner if ‖C‖ ≥ 2
and there is one manipulator and no other voters. If ‖C‖ ≥ 4, the optimal action
for the manipulator is to rank the lexicographically smallest candidate above the
lexicographically largest candidate.
• Y -CUCM-runoff is in P by the following argument. It suffices to consider the case
where there is one manipulator and no other voters. If the election has two candidates,
the manipulator must rank the lexicographically smaller above the lexicographically
larger candidate so that both candidates win the initial round and runoff. If ||C|| ≥ 4,
then there are zero, two, or three winners in the initial round. If there are three
winners in the initial round, there are no winners in the runoff. If there are two
winners in the initial round, then the lexicographically largest candidate is ranked
above the lexicographically smallest candidate. But then there are also no winners in
the runoff without revoting.
• Y -CUCM-revoting is NP-complete by reducing from SAT. Observe that ψ ∈
SAT reduces to Y -CUCM-revoting for the candidate set: p encoding ψ and
max(3, f(2#vars(ψ))) dummy candidates all lexicographically larger than p. Let the
preferred candidate be p and let there be zero nonmanipulative voters and one ma-
nipulative voter. In order for p to win the runoff, there have to be two winners in
the initial round. This implies that ψ is satisfiable. And if ψ is satisfiable, p can
be made a winner by having the manipulator vote so that p is ranked last and its
ordering over the dummy candidates codes a satisfying assignment to ψ. In the runoff
the manipulator must change her vote so that p is ranked first.
So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
Theorem 4.7 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such
that X-CUCM is NP-complete, X-CUCM-runoff is in P, and X-CUCM-revoting is
NP-complete.
Proof. Let f(·) be as specified in Definition 4.2. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y
is defined as follows:
If ‖V ‖ 6= 1 or ‖C‖ = 1 then everyone loses. Otherwise, we’ll handle things based on the
number of candidates and the single voter v, as described below.
If ‖C‖ = 2 and the lexicographically larger candidate is more preferred than the lexico-
graphically smaller candidate by the voter then everyone wins, else everyone loses.
If ‖C‖ ≥ 3, the lexicographically smallest candidate’s name encodes a formula ψ, ‖C‖ ≥
f(2#vars(ψ)) + 1 (the “+1” is as we’ll not involve the lexicographically smallest candidate
in encoding the assignment), v’s vote on all candidates other than the lexicographically
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smallest candidate codes an assignment that satisfies ψ, and the lexicographically smallest
candidate is more preferred than the lexicographically largest candidate by v, then the
lexicographically largest and smallest candidates win, else everyone loses.
That completes the specification of Y .
Now we explain why this system Y meets all the requirements of the theorem in the
model where there is always a runoff.
• Clearly the winner problem for Y is in P.
• Y -CUCM is NP-complete by reducing from SAT. Observe that ψ ∈ SAT reduces
to Y -CUCM for the candidate set: p encoding ψ and max(2, f(2#vars(ψ))) dummy
candidates all lexicographically larger than p. Let the preferred candidate be p and
let there be zero nonmanipulative voters and one manipulative voter. The manipulator
must vote with p at the top of her preference order and code a satisfying assignment
to ψ over the dummy candidates. If ψ 6∈ SAT then no one wins. Therefore Y -CUCM
is NP-complete.
• Y -CUCM-runoff is in P since in the initial round we always have zero or two winners.
However, when we have two winners (and more than two candidates), they always
lose in the second round unless the manipulator can change her vote. So in the second
round scheme (runoff without revoting), no one ever can win if we have more than
two candidates.
• Y -CUCM-revoting is NP-complete by the same argument that we used to show that
Y -CUCM is NP-complete. Here, it works by, when the ψ encoded by the lexicograph-
ically smallest candidate is satisfiable, the manipulator in the initial round conveys
(in the dummy candidates) a satisfying assignment, and she puts the lexicographically
smallest candidate as her most preferred candidate. In the runoff the manipulator puts
the lexicographically smallest candidate as her least preferred candidate. (So we’ll go
to the ‖C‖ = 2 case of Y in the runoff and we will have two winners, including the
lexicographically smallest candidate.)
So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
Theorem 4.8 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such that
X-CUCM is NP-complete, but X-CUCM-runoff and X-CUCM-revoting are in P.
Proof. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y is defined as follows:
If ‖C‖ ≥ 2 then STV′ (where STV′ is as defined in Theorem 4.3). Otherwise, everyone
loses.
That completes the specification of Y .
Now we explain why this system Y meets all the requirements of the theorem in the
model where there is always a runoff.
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• Clearly Y has a p-time winner problem.
• Y -CWCM is NP-complete since Y -CUCM on at least two candidates corresponds to
STV′-CUCM.
• Y -CUCM-runoff and Y -CUCM-revoting are each in P since the initial round results
in at most one winner, and so the runoff will never give a winner (even with revoting).
So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
Theorem 4.9 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such that
X-CUCM is in P, X-CUCM-runoff is NP-complete, and X-CUCM-revoting is in P.
Proof. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y is defined as follows.
We will utilize several different special candidate names in our proof. The candidate
names are as follows:
• 〈Shiva1, ǫ〉, which we refer to as Shiva1.
• 〈Shiva2, ψ〉, where ψ is a boolean formula, which we refer to as Shiva2-like.
• 〈Angel, 1〉, which we refer to as Angel1.
• 〈Angel, 2〉, which we refer to as Angel2.
• More angels are used as needed.
Let f(·) be as specified in Definition 4.2. For our election Y , the candidate set is expected
to be one of the following forms:
(a) One Shiva2-like candidate with formula ψ, the Shiva1 candidate, and enough angel
candidates to encode 2#vars(ψ) + 1 possibilities (2#vars(ψ) assignments to ψ and one
special “Begone-2” ordering), i.e., f(2#vars(ψ) + 1) angel candidates.
(b) One Shiva2-like candidate with formula ψ and enough angel candidates to encode
2#vars(ψ) + 1 possibilities, i.e., f(2#vars(ψ) + 1) angel candidates.
Let Y be defined as follows:
If ‖V ‖ 6= 1 or C is not of an expected form then everyone loses.
If C is of form (a) and the angel candidates’ restriction of the voter’s vote encodes an
assignment to ψ, then the Shiva2-like candidate and all of the angel candidates win, else
everyone loses.
If C is of form (b) and the angel candidates’ restriction of the voter’s vote encodes the
special “Begone-2” ordering or a satisfying assignment to ψ then all of the angels win, else
everyone loses.
That completes the specification of Y .
Now we explain why this system Y meets all the requirements of the theorem in the
model where there is always a runoff.
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• Clearly the winner problem for Y is in P.
• Y -CUCM is in P by looking at both of the allowed candidate set forms:
– For form (a), when the voter casts a vote that encodes an assignment to ψ over
the angels then everyone wins who can possibly win.
– For form (b), when the voter casts a vote that encodes the special “Begone-2”
ordering over the angels then everyone wins who can possibly win.
• Y -CUCM-runoff is NP-complete by reducing from SAT. Observe that to see if
ψ ∈ SAT ask if Angel1 can win the Y -CUCM-runoff instance with the candidate
set: Shiva1, 〈Shiva2, ψ〉, and f(2
#vars(ψ) + 1) angels. Let the voter set contain zero
nonmanipulative voters and one manipulative voter.
If ψ ∈ SAT, then the manipulator casts the initial-round vote that corresponds to a
satisfying assignment to ψ, so the Shiva2-like candidate and all of the angels win in
the initial round and all of the angels win in the runoff. Conversely, if ψ /∈ SAT then
Angel1 would not be able to win in the runoff.
• Y -CUCM-revoting is in P by looking at both of the allowed candidate set forms:
– For form (a), when the voter casts a vote that codes an assignment to ψ over
the angels in the initial round and then changes her vote to encode the special
“Begone-2” ordering over the angels then everyone wins who can possibly win.
– For form (b), everyone loses by the end of the runoff.
So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
Theorem 4.10 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such
that X-CUCM and X-CUCM-runoff are NP-complete, but X-CUCM-revoting is in P.
Proof. Let f(·) be as specified in Definition 4.2. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y
is defined as follows. The allowed (all others will cause everyone to lose) candidate types
for Y are described in Table 1.
For our election Y , the candidate set is expected to be in one of the following forms (we
assume w.l.o.g. that every formula has at least one variable):
(a) 〈1, 1〉, 〈2, ψ〉, and enough type-4 dummy candidates so that a vote including them can
encode an assignment to ψ, i.e., at least f(2#vars(ψ)) dummy candidates.
(b) 〈1, 2〉, 〈3, ψ〉, 〈5, 1〉, 〈5, 2〉, and enough type-4 dummy candidates so that a vote includ-
ing them can encode an assignment to ψ, i.e., at least f(2#vars(ψ)) dummy candidates.
(c) 〈3, ψ〉, 〈5, 1〉, 〈5, 2〉, and enough type-4 dummy candidates so that a vote including
them can encode an assignment to ψ, i.e., at least f(2#vars(ψ)) dummy candidates.
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Candidate Form Role in our proof
〈1, 1〉 Seeks to make the initial round
hard.
〈1, 2〉 Seeks to make the initial round
easy.
〈2, ψ〉 Candidate coding a formula
intended as part of a hard ini-
tial round.
〈3, ψ〉 Candidate coding a formula
intended as part of a hard
runoff.
〈4, (any string)〉 “Type-4” dummy candidate,
used to make votes so big as
to encode assignments.
〈5, 1〉, 〈5, 2〉 Special dummy candidates to
allow vote changes to show
through in some cases.
Table 1: Allowed candidate types for the election Y used in the proof of Theorem 4.10.
Let Y be defined as follows:
If ‖V ‖ 6= 1 or C is not of an expected form then everyone loses. Otherwise, we’ll handle
things as described below (note that in this case there is a single voter v).
If C is of form (a) and the type-4 dummy candidates’ restriction of v’s vote encodes a
satisfying assignment to ψ, then 〈2, ψ〉 wins. Otherwise, everyone loses.
If C is of form (b) and 〈5, 2〉 > 〈5, 1〉 in v’s vote then 〈3, ψ〉, 〈5, 1〉, 〈5, 2〉, and all of the
type-4 dummy candidates win. In all other cases where C is of form (b), everyone loses.
If C is of form (c) and 〈5, 1〉 > 〈5, 2〉 in v’s vote or the type-4 dummy candidates’
restriction of v’s vote encodes a satisfying assignment to ψ, then 〈3, ψ〉 wins. Otherwise,
everyone loses.
This completes the specification of Y .
Now we must ensure that Y meets all of the requirements of this theorem in the model
where there is always a runoff.
• Clearly the winner problem for Y is in P.
• Y -CUCM is NP-complete since to test if ψ ∈ SAT, we can ask if 〈2, ψ〉 can win the Y -
CUCM instance with candidate set {〈1, 1〉, 〈2, ψ〉, f(2#vars(ψ)) type-4 dummy candi-
dates} and the voter set containing zero nonmanipulative voters and one manipulative
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voter. For 〈2, ψ〉 to win the manipulator must code a satisfying assignment to ψ in
her ordering over the type-4 dummy candidates. If ψ /∈ SAT, then no one can win.
• Y -CUCM-runoff is NP-complete since to test if ψ ∈ SAT, we can
ask if 〈3, ψ〉 can win the Y -CUCM-runoff instance with candidate set
{〈1, 2〉, 〈3, ψ〉, 〈5, 1〉, 〈5, 2〉, f(2#vars(ψ)) type-4 dummy candidates} and voter set con-
taining zero nonmanipulative voters and one manipulative voter.
Note that we need 〈5, 2〉 > 〈5, 1〉 in the manipulator’s vote in order for 〈3, ψ〉 to make
it to the runoff. If ψ /∈ SAT, then 〈3, ψ〉 cannot win. Otherwise, if ψ ∈ SAT, voting so
that 〈5, 2〉 > 〈5, 1〉 in the manipulator’s vote and with the type-4 dummy order giving
a satisfying assignment to ψ, makes 〈3, ψ〉 a winner.
• Y -CUCM-revoting is in P by looking at each of the allowed candidate set forms:
– For form (a), everyone loses by the end of the runoff.
– For form (b), when voter v casts a vote where 〈5, 2〉 > 〈5, 1〉 in the initial round
and a vote where 〈5, 1〉 > 〈5, 2〉 in the runoff, then everyone wins who can possibly
win.
– For form (c), everyone loses by the end of the runoff.
All other cases have everyone lose immediately. Thus Y -CUCM-revoting is in P.
So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
4.1.2 Weighted Cases of the Realizability Theorem
We now present the proofs of the eight weighted cases of Theorem 4.1. As is typical for
NP-hardness proofs for weighted manipulation, we will usually reduce from the well-known
NP-complete problem Partition: Given a nonempty set of positive integers k1, . . . , kt that
sums to 2K, we ask if k1, . . . , kt can be partitioned into two subsets of equal size.
Theorem 4.11 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such
that X-CWCM, X-CWCM-runoff, and X-CWCM-revoting are all NP-complete.
Proof. Let X be Veto. This follows directly from [HH07] and Theorem 4.23. ❑
Theorem 4.12 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such
that X-CWCM, X-CWCM-runoff, and X-CWCM-revoting are all in P.
Proof. Let X be Plurality. This follows directly from Theorem 4.21. ❑
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Theorem 4.13 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such that
X-CWCM is in P and both X-CWCM-runoff and X-CWCM-revoting are NP-complete.
Proof. Let X be defined as follows:
If ‖C‖ ≤ 4 then Llull, else everyone wins.
That completes the specification of X.
This follows directly from [FHS12] and Theorem 4.27. ❑
Theorem 4.14 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such
that X-CWCM and X-CWCM-runoff are in P, but X-CWCM-revoting is NP-complete.
Proof. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y is defined as follows:
If ‖C‖ = 3 then candidates with plurality scores ≥ 50% win.
If ‖C‖ = 2 then candidates with plurality scores > 50% win.
Otherwise, everyone loses.
That completes the specification of Y .
Now we explain why this system Y meets all the requirements of the theorem in the
model where there is always a runoff.
• Clearly the winner problem for Y is in P.
• Y -CWCM is in P since in all cases where a preferred candidate can win, the optimal
action for the manipulators is to vote for that candidate.
• Y -CWCM-runoff is in P since the only way to have winners in a two-stage Y election
is to have three candidates in the initial round and two candidates in the runoff. No
candidates can win in the runoff unless revoting is allowed, so Y -CWCM-runoff is in
P.
• Y -CWCM-revoting is NP-complete since to test if a set of positive integers k1, . . . , kt ∈
Partition we can ask if the candidate p can win the Y -CWCM-revoting instance with
the candidate set {p, r, ℓ} and the voter set containing zero nonmanipulative voters
and t manipulative voters. Let the t manipulators have weights that correspond to
the Partition instance, i.e., k1, . . . , kt such that
∑t
i=1 ki = 2K.
To ensure that p is an overall winner, the manipulators must partition their votes
between p and w.l.o.g. r, since the only way to have a runoff where a candidate can win
is when two candidates win in the initial round. Then in the runoff the manipulators
all vote for p. Thus if there is a way for the manipulators to partition their votes into
two equal-weight subsets, then p can be made the overall winner. Otherwise, p cannot
be made the overall winner. Therefore Y -CWCM-revoting is NP-complete.
So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
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Theorem 4.15 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such
that X-CWCM is NP-complete, X-CWCM-runoff is in P, and X-CWCM-revoting is
NP-complete.
Proof. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y is defined as follows:
If ‖C‖ = 3 then candidates with plurality scores of exactly 50% win.
If ‖C‖ = 2 then candidates with plurality scores > 50% win.
Otherwise, everyone loses.
That completes the specification of Y .
Now we explain why this system Y meets all the requirements of the theorem in the
model where there is always a runoff.
• Clearly the winner problem for Y is in P.
• Y -CWCM is NP-complete since to test if a set of positive integers k1, . . . , kt ∈ Partition
we can ask if the candidate p can win the Y -CWCM instance with the candidate set
{p, r, ℓ} and the voter set containing zero nonmanipulative voters and t manipulative
voters. Let the t manipulators have weights that correspond to the Partition instance,
i.e., k1, . . . , kt such that
∑t
i=1 ki = 2K.
Since ‖C‖ = 3, p is a winner if and only if p has a score of exactly 50% of the available
vote weight. So, p can be made a winner if and only of the manipulators can partition
their votes into two equal-weight subsets.
• Y -CWCM-runoff is in P since no one can win in the runoff without revoting. If the
initial round has three candidates where two attain exactly 50% of the vote to move
on to the runoff, no one will win in the runoff since neither will have greater than 50%
of the available vote weight. If the initial round has only two candidates, the winner
will lose the runoff since when there is only one candidate, that candidate always loses.
In all other cases the candidates all lose immediately. Therefore Y -CWCM-runoff is
in P.
• Y -CWCM-revoting is NP-complete since to test if a set of positive integers k1, . . . , kt ∈
Partition we can ask if the candidate p can win the Y -CWCM-revoting instance with
the candidate set {p, r, ℓ} and the voter set containing zero nonmanipulative voters
and t manipulative voters. Let the t manipulators have weights that correspond to
the Partition instance, i.e., k1, . . . , kt such that
∑t
i=1 ki = 2K.
To ensure that p is an overall winner, the manipulators must partition their votes
between p and w.l.o.g. r, since the only way to have a runoff where a candidate
can win is when two candidates win in the initial round. Then in the runoff the
manipulators all vote for p to increase p’s score to be greater than 50%. Thus if
there is a way to partition the vote weight of the manipulators into two equal-weight
subsets, then p can be made the overall winner. Otherwise, p cannot be made the
overall winner. Therefore Y -CWCM-revoting is NP-complete.
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So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
Theorem 4.16 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such
that X-CWCM is NP-complete, but X-CWCM-runoff and X-CWCM-revoting are in P.
Proof. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y is defined as follows:
If ‖C‖ ≥ 2 then the candidate with the highest veto score wins as long as the winner is
unique. Otherwise (if there is no unique winner or ‖C‖ = 1), everyone loses.
That completes the specification of Y
Now we explain why this system Y meets all the requirements of the theorem in the
model where there is always a runoff.
• Clearly Y has a p-time winner problem.
• Y -CWCM is NP-complete since Y -CWCM restricted to three candidates corresponds
to Veto-CWCM restricted to three candidates in the unique winner model, which is
known to be NP-complete [CSL07].
• Y -CWCM-runoff and Y -CWCM-revoting are each in P since the initial round results
in at most one winner, and so the runoff will never give a winner (even with revoting).
So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
Theorem 4.17 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such
that X-CWCM is in P, X-CWCM-runoff is NP-complete, and X-CWCM-revoting is in P.
Proof. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y is defined as follows:
If ‖C‖ = 3 and there is a candidate with plurality score 0 then candidates with plurality
scores greater than or equal to half of the highest occurring score win.
If ‖C‖ = 2 then candidates with plurality scores less than or equal to half of the highest
occurring plurality score win.
If ‖C‖ = 1 then that candidate wins.
Otherwise, everyone loses.
That completes the specification of Y .
Now we explain why this system Y meets all the requirements of the theorem in the
model where there is always a runoff.
• Clearly Y has a p-time winner problem.
• Y -CWCM is in P since the optimal action for the manipulators is to vote for their
preferred candidate p (when ‖C‖ = 3 or ‖C‖ = 1) to maximize p’s score or to not
vote for p (when ‖C‖ = 2) to minimize p’s score.
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• Y -CWCM-runoff is NP-complete since to test if a set of positive integers k1, . . . , kt ∈
Partition we can ask if the candidate p can win the Y -CWCM-runoff instance with
the candidate set {p, r, ℓ} and the voter set containing one nonmanipulative voter and
t manipulative voters. Let the nonmanipulator have weight K and vote r > p > ℓ and
let the t manipulative voters have weights that correspond to the Partition instance,
i.e., k1, . . . , kt such that
∑t
i=1 ki = 2K.
To ensure that the preferred candidate p wins, ℓ needs to score 0 and p needs to score
at least K to advance to the runoff. Then p and r will proceed to the runoff. In order
for p to win the runoff, p needs to score at most K. So, p needs to score exactly K in
order to become a winner.
• Y -CWCM-revoting is in P by the following argument. If V = ∅, simply check if p is a
winner of the two-stage election. Now assume that V 6= ∅. If ‖C‖ = 1, p will always
be a winner. If ‖C‖ > 3, there are no winners. If ‖C‖ = 2, the runoff will consist of
at most one candidate. So, the optimal action is for all manipulators to not vote for
p in the initial round, to maximize p’s chances of participating in the runoff. Finally,
let ‖C‖ = 3. If p can be made the unique winner of the initial round, then p wins the
overall election. If that is not possible, and p makes it to the runoff, there are two
participants in the runoff. In both cases, the optimal action for the manipulators in
the initial round is to vote for p. And if the runoff has two participants, the optimal
action in the runoff is to not vote for p.
So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
We add an additional case to the election system used in the proof of the previous case
to raise the complexity of manipulation to be NP-complete, while keeping the complexity
of manipulation with revoting runoffs in P.
Theorem 4.18 There exists an election system, X, with a p-time winner problem such
that X-CWCM and X-CWCM-runoff are NP-complete, but X-CWCM-revoting is in P.
Proof. Let X = AlwaysWinners(Y ), where Y is defined as follows:
If ‖C‖ = 5 and there are exactly four candidates that have plurality scores of exactly
25%, then these four candidates win.
If ‖C‖ = 3 and there is a candidate with plurality score 0 then candidates with plurality
scores greater than or equal to half of the highest occurring score win.
If ‖C‖ = 2 then candidates with plurality scores less than or equal to half of the highest
occurring plurality score win.
If ‖C‖ = 1 then that candidate wins.
Otherwise, everyone loses.
That completes the specification of Y .
Now we explain why this system Y meets all the requirements of the theorem in the
model where there is always a runoff.
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• Clearly Y has a p-time winner problem.
• Y -CWCM is NP-complete since to test if a set of positive integers k1, . . . , kt ∈ Partition
we can ask if the candidate p can win the Y -CWCM instance with the candidate set
C = {a, b, c, p, ℓ}, one weight-K nonmanipulator voting for a, one weight-K nonma-
nipulator voting for b, and t manipulative voters. Let the t manipulative voters have
weights that correspond to the Partition instance, i.e., k1, . . . , kt such that
∑
ki = 2K.
It is immediate that p is a winner if and only if exactly half of the manipulator weight
votes for p. This is possible if and only if k1, . . . , kt ∈ Partition.
• Y -CWCM-runoff is NP-complete by exactly the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 4.17.
• Y -CWCM-revoting is in P by the same argument as used above for the previous case
(Theorem 4.17). Observe that the addition of the ‖C‖ = 5 case does not increase the
complexity of Y -CWCM-revoting: There are never five candidates in the runoff and
if there are five candidates in the initial round, there will be zero or four candidates
in the runoff, and so there will be no winners in the runoff
So Y satisfies the theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and
AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies the theorem in our standard model. ❑
4.2 The AlwaysWinners Construction
We now describe the transformation AlwaysWinners that was used in the proofs of many
of the cases of Theorem 4.1. What this transformation will do is it will take an election
system and will transform it into a new election system that will (except when the candidate
set is empty) always have at least one winner, yet that is so closely related to the original
election system that the complexity of the original system is unchanged, with respect to
the three problems we are concerned with here in the model where there is always a runoff,
even where there is a unique winner in the initial round (and in fact, with respect to many,
many other types of manipulative actions). Note that once we have an election system that
will always have at least one winner, the model in which there is always a runoff coincides
with our standard model.
This transformation thus relatively broadly addresses a persistently annoying issue.
Many people, including the authors, feel that it is ugly and asymmetric to require nonempty
winner sets yet to allow all of C to be the winner set. And indeed a number of papers in
computational social choice do allow the winner set to be any member of 2C . On the other
hand, traditionally in social choice, the requirement that the winner set be nonempty is
part of the definition of elections. Our transformation shows that the difference in models
isn’t as large as one might think; one can often adopt the more symmetric model, yet by
this transformation one will know that one’s results also hold in the more restrictive model.
We now give the transformation AlwaysWinners . First let us describe informally how
it works, and then we’ll describe it and its properties more formally. Let E be the election
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system we want to transform under AlwaysWinners . Informally, suppose that we have
a candidate name, new, that is not part of our universe of legal candidate names. (Of
course this is untrue; the universe of names is as it is. But please indulge us for a few
more lines, and we’ll then avoid this problem in our more formal approach.) Then under
AlwaysWinners , if new is not an input candidate then all candidates win, and if new is
an input candidate then new wins and also all candidates win who under E would win if
in our input election new is removed and all votes are masked down to remove new. Note
that this system always has a winner (if the set of candidates is not empty). Also, it can
be easily seen to retain most of the manipulative-action complexities of E , as we’ll discuss
later.
As admitted above, we can’t just make a new name appear. But we can get the same
effect formally, by shifting all the names in the universe up by one spot to open up a space
for our new name, and then when we’re using those other names in simulating the original
system, by shifting them back down again. And that is precisely what we will do.
So we now more carefully and correctly specify the transformation AlwaysWinners .
Definition 4.19 Let E be an election system (that perhaps has no winners even on inputs
on which C is nonempty). Let the set of legal names for candidates (i.e., the set of all
strings) be enumerated in lexicographic order by s0, s1, s2, . . . (e.g., “ǫ, 0, 1, 00, 01, . . .” if
names are taken to be binary strings). Let ++ denote a one-step increase in this order, i.e.,
si++ = si+1. The ++ operator naturally applies to sets of candidates, namely as defined by
A++ = {a++ | a ∈ A}. And for any set A of candidates such that s0 6∈ A, we similarly
define the decrement of the set, namely by A- - = {a | a++ ∈ A}. On candidate set C and
voter set V , AlwaysWinners(E) does the following. If s0 6∈ C, then the winner set is C. If
s0 ∈ C then the winner set is E((C − {s0})- -, V
′)++ ∪ {s0}, where V
′ is V with s0 masked
out of each preference order and then each candidate name decremented in each order and
where E(Cˆ, Vˆ ) denotes the winner set, under E, of the election over candidate set Cˆ and
voter set Vˆ .
The crucial things to notice about AlwaysWinners(E) are the following, which hold for all
election systems E (including ones that allow there to be no winners on some inputs for which
the input candidate set of the E instance is nonempty) in the model where there is always a
runoff. AlwaysWinners(E) always has at least one winner (when the input candidate set of
the AlwaysWinners(E) instance is nonempty). For E-CUCM (respectively, E-CUCM-runoff,
E-CUCM-revoting) it holds that if the problem is in P then AlwaysWinners(E)-CUCM (re-
spectively, AlwaysWinners(E)-CUCM-runoff, AlwaysWinners(E)-CUCM-revoting) is in P.
For E-CUCM (respectively, E-CUCM-runoff, E-CUCM-revoting) it holds that if the problem
is NP-complete then AlwaysWinners(E)-CUCM (respectively, AlwaysWinners(E)-CUCM-
runoff, AlwaysWinners(E)-CUCM-revoting) is NP-complete. Part of the easy task of seeing
that these complexity connections hold is noticing that given an instance of one of these
problems under E , one can increment all candidate names both within the candidate set
and the voter preferences, can then add in a new candidate s0 and extend voter preferences
arbitrarily to include that new candidate (e.g., putting it last in each voter’s preferences),
22
and then we can note that a candidate p can be made a winner in the initial election under E
exactly if p++ can be made a winner under AlwaysWinners(E) in the transformed election.
(And we mention in passing that the analogous claim holds for the so-called “destructive”
case in which we seek to preclude p from being a winner, though destructive cases are not
a focus of this paper.)
The observations above are what we need to conclude that, for the election systems Y
built in the proofs of many of the cases of Theorem 4.1, AlwaysWinners(Y ) satisfies each
theorem in the model where there is always a runoff, and has the property that it always
has a winner (when the candidate set is nonempty). Since our standard model and the
model where there is always a runoff are the same for election systems that always have
a winner, AlwaysWinners(Y ) also satisfies the conditions of the theorem in our standard
model.
However, we comment that the above transformation will be useful in the exact same
way for many types of manipulative attacks other than the three discussed above. It in fact
will similarly work (keeping in mind that we are always in the so-called nonunique-winner
model—aka the co-winner model—which focuses on whether a given candidate is/is not a
winner) for all standard types of voter control (adding/deleting/partitioning), all standard
types of manipulation, and all standard types of bribery. Thus, the above transformation
goes quite far in paving over the divide between those who feel that requiring nonempty
winner sets is unnatural and those who feel that failing to require nonempty winner sets is
unnatural.
4.3 Specific Voting Rules and Scoring Protocols
The following result provides—if we keep in mind that it is well-known that Veto-CUCM
is in P—a natural, unweighted case where the classic manipulation problem is simple but
the runoff and revoting runoff versions are hard. Even Narodytska and Walsh’s [NW13]
work, in which they allowed themselves the freedom to use different systems in the first
and second round, did not obtain any natural, unweighted example of runoffs or revoting
runoffs increasing complexity.
Theorem 4.20 Veto-CUCM-runoff and Veto-CUCM-revoting are each NP-complete.
Proof. We will reduce from the well-known NP-complete Exact Cover by 3-Sets Problem
(X3C): Given a set B = {b1, . . . , b3k}, and a collection S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of three-element
subsets of B, we ask if S has an exact cover for B, i.e., if there exists a subcollection S ′
of S such that every element of B occurs in exactly one member of S ′. Without loss of
generality, we assume that k ≥ 1 and n ≥ 3. We will denote which elements of B are in a
given Si by some new ij variables: Si = {bi1 , bi2 , bi3}.
Since Veto-CUCM is in P (simply greedily veto all candidates that score higher than p),
the only place where hardness can come in is in the selection of the set of winners in the
initial round.
Our election has the following set C of candidates: p (the preferred candidate), b1, . . . , b3k
and s1, . . . , sn (candidates corresponding to the X3C instance), r1, . . . , rk (candidates that
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will be vetoed in the runoff), d (a buffer candidate), and ℓ (a candidate that always loses in
the initial round). We have k manipulators. We have the following nonmanipulators. (· · ·
in a vote denotes that the remaining candidates are in arbitrary order.)
• For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
– one nonmanipulator voting · · · > p > bi1 > si,
– one nonmanipulator voting · · · > p > bi2 > si,
– and one nonmanipulator voting · · · > p > bi3 > si.
• Three nonmanipulators voting · · · > p.
• For every c ∈ B ∪ {r1, . . . , rk} ∪ {d}, three nonmanipulators voting · · · > p > c.
• One nonmanipulator voting · · · > p > ℓ.
• For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, one nonmanipulator voting · · · > p > d > si > ℓ.
Note that every candidate other than ℓ receives three vetoes from the nonmanipulators in
the initial round. And ℓ receives n+ 1 > 3 vetoes from the nonmanipulators.
Let S ′ = {Sj1 , . . . , Sjk} ⊆ S be an exact cover for B. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let the ith
manipulator vote · · · > ri > sji. We claim that p is a winner of the overall election
(even without revoting). It is immediate that the winner set of the initial round is C −
{ℓ} − {sj | Sj ∈ S
′}. Since ℓ does not participate in the runoff, p gains one veto from
the nonmanipulator voting · · · > p > ℓ. Since every candidate in B ∪ {r1, . . . , rk} ∪ {d}
participates in the runoff, this is the only veto that p gains. Since ℓ does not participate in
the runoff, each si that participates in the runoff gains one veto from the nonmanipulator
voting · · · > d > si > ℓ. d gains k ≥ 1 vetoes from the nonmanipulators voting · · · > d >
si > ℓ such that Si ∈ S
′ and every b ∈ B gains one veto from the nonmanipulator voting
· · · > p > b > si such that b ∈ Si and Si ∈ S
′. Every candidate ri gains a veto from the
manipulator voting · · · > ri > sji . It follows that p is a winner in the runoff.
For the converse, we will show the manipulations described above are the only way to
make p a winner. Suppose the manipulators can vote (in the initial round and the runoff)
in such a way that p becomes a winner of the overall election. Recall that in the initial
round, every candidate other that ℓ receives three vetoes from the nonmanipulators and
that ℓ receives n + 1 > 3 vetoes. Since there are k manipulators, ℓ does not participate
in the runoff and at most k other candidates (the ones vetoed by a manipulator) do not
participate in the runoff. Since ℓ does not participate in the runoff, p gains one veto from
the nonmanipulator voting · · · > p > ℓ.
Suppose there is a candidate c ∈ B ∪ {r1, . . . , rk} ∪ {d} that does not participate in
the runoff. Then p gains three vetoes from the nonmanipulators voting · · · > p > c, and
thus p receives at least seven vetoes in the runoff. There are at least 2k candidates from
B that participate in the runoff and each of these candidates is vetoed three times in the
initial round and does not gain any vetoes from deleting ℓ. Since p receives at least seven
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vetoes in the runoff, each candidate in B that participates in the runoff needs to gain at
least four vetoes, so these candidates need to gain a total of at least 8k vetoes. But the
most vetoes that these candidates can gain in total is three vetoes for each candidate si
that does not participate in the runoff plus k vetoes from the manipulators. Since fewer
than k si candidates do not participate in the runoff, the B candidates that participate in
the runoff gain a total of at most 4k vetoes, which is not enough.
It follows that the only candidates other than ℓ that do not participate in the runoff are
si candidates. Note that candidates in {r1, . . . , rk} will not gain vetoes from the nonma-
nipulators in the runoff, and so each manipulator needs to veto exactly one ri in the runoff.
To make sure that every candidate b ∈ B gains at least one veto, we need to delete a set
of si candidates corresponding to a cover. Since we can delete at most k such candidates,
these candidates will correspond to an exact cover. ❑
It is easy to argue, in contrast with the result of Theorem 4.20 regarding Plurality’s
close cousin Veto, that Plurality is easy, even in the weighted case, since throwing all one’s
votes to p is always optimal.
It is important to make the distinction between our result that Plurality-CWCM-runoff
and Plurality-CWCM-revoting are each in P and Narodytska and Walsh’s claim that com-
puting a weighted coalition manipulation for Plurality with Runoff is NP-hard with or
without revoting [NW13]. For their results they use the definition TopTwo Then Plurality,
instead of the arguably more natural approach of using the same system at each stage,
which is what we are considering here.
Theorem 4.21 Plurality-CWCM-runoff and Plurality-CWCM-revoting are each in P.
We mention the following result, which holds because by brute-force partitioning of the
integer ‖V ‖ into at most (‖C‖!)2 named buckets (one for each pair of possible votes, though
a second-round decrease in candidates could make the numbers even smaller than this), one
can solve even the revoting runoff manipulation question (and of course the same holds for
plain runoffs).
Theorem 4.22 For any election system X having a P winner problem, and for any integer
k, X-CUCM-revoting restricted to k candidates is in P.
The following claim transfers to our two problems the dichotomy result for scoring
protocols known for the nonrunoff case.
Theorem 4.23 For every scoring protocol X, X-CWCM-runoff and X-CWCM-revoting
are in P if X is Plurality or Triviality (or a direct transform of one of those, in a sense
that can be made formal, see [HH07]), and otherwise are NP-complete.
Proof. For Plurality, this follows from Theorem 4.21 and for Triviality, this is trivial. For
every other weighted scoring protocol X, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [HH07] give
a reduction f from the NP-complete problem Partition to X-CWCM with the property
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that for all x, if x ∈ Partition, then p can be made the unique winner in f(x), and if x 6∈
Partition, then p can not be made a winner in f(x). So, if x ∈ Partition, then p can be made
the unique winner of the initial round, and thus the unique winner of the overall election.
And if x 6∈ Partition, then p will never make it to the final round. ❑
The case of just one manipulator is a natural and important case. It also can often
be surprisingly well handled, thanks to the lovely result—initially due for the unweighted
case to the seminal work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a] and since then much
extended—that the natural (p-time) greedy manipulation algorithm (giving one’s highest
point value to p and then giving, in turn, the highest remaining value to the candidate
who has the lowest point total among those not yet assigned points by the manipulative
voter) is optimal (i.e., finds a successful manipulation when one exists) for both weighted
and unweighted scoring protocols, for the case when there is just one manipulator. The
following theorem implies that that result does not carry over to runoff elections.
Theorem 4.24 The standard one-manipulator p-time greedy algorithm for scoring pro-
tocols is not optimal for HalfApproval-CUCM-runoff and HalfApproval-CUCM-revoting,
restricted to at most one manipulator.
Proof. Consider the election with candidate set {p, a, b, c}, a nonmanipulator voting
a > p > b > c, a nonmanipulator voting a > b > p > c, and one manipulator. The scores
of p, a, b, c from the nonmanipulators are 1, 2, 1, 0. The greedy algorithm would give the
following vote for the manipulator: p > c > b > a. Then p and a are the winners of the
initial round, and there is no way for p to win the runoff. However, if the manipulator votes
p > b > c > a, then p, a, and b are the winners of the initial round, and p is a winner of
the runoff (even without revoting). ❑
Theorem 4.20 gave a case where a simple-to-manipulate unweighted scoring protocol
became hard for runoffs, with or without revoting. The following result gives a new example
of runoffs increasing complexity, this time for the one-manipulator case. It is natural to
wonder whether the following theorem itself implies Theorem 4.24. The answer is that the
following theorem does not imply that, but it does imply something a bit weaker, namely, it
says that Theorem 4.24 holds unless P = NP. (Of course, Theorem 4.24 holds absolutely; it
doesn’t require a P 6= NP hypothesis.) HalfApproval-CUCM for one manipulator is clearly
in P—for example by the greedy algorithm we mentioned above—and so the following result
does express a raising of complexity. Even HalfApproval-CUCM (i.e., with an unbounded
number of manipulators) is in P (this follows from the argument of [XCP10, Corollary 4.2]).
So this gives even more of a contrast between classic and runoff manipulation complexity.
Theorem 4.25 HalfApproval-CUCM-runoff and HalfApproval-CUCM-revoting are each
NP-complete, even when restricted to having at most one manipulator.
Proof. This construction operates similarly to the construction from Theorem 4.20. Note
that we have fewer candidates in the runoff than in the initial round, and so in contrast to
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the proof of Theorem 4.20, the manipulator has fewer vetoes to contribute in the runoff and
some candidates may have fewer vetoes in the runoff than they had in the initial round.
We must be careful of how these two points affect our construction. We reduce from Exact
Cover by 3-Sets (X3C): Given a set B = {b1, . . . , b3k}, and a collection S = {S1, . . . , Sn}
of three-element subsets of B, we ask if S has an exact cover for B, i.e., if there exists a
subcollection S ′ of S such that every element of B occurs in exactly one member of S ′. We
will denote which elements of B are in a given Si by some new ij variables: Si = {bi1 , bi2 , bi3}.
Without loss of generality we assume that n ≥ 3 and n ≥ k ≥ 1.
We pad the election from the proof of Theorem 4.20. We have the following candidates:
p (the preferred candidate), B = {b1, . . . , b3k} and S = {s1, . . . , sn} (corresponding to the
X3C instance), R = {r1, . . . , rn+2k} (candidates that will pad the votes in the runoff), d (a
buffer candidate), and L = {ℓ1, . . . , ℓ2n+5k} and ℓˆ (candidates that will lose in the initial
round). Summarizing, this gives us the candidate set C = {p, d, ℓˆ}∪B∪S∪R∪L. We have
‖C‖ = 4n + 10k + 3, so each vote approves ⌈‖C‖/2⌉ = 2n + 5k + 2 candidates and vetoes
2n+5k+1 candidates. Observe that the number of vetoes contributed by a vote is equal to
‖L‖+ 1, which is crucial to pad our construction. We have the following nonmanipulators.
(A set in the specification of a vote, e.g., R in the first vote specified below, denotes that
candidates in that set are in arbitrary order in that part of the vote.)
• For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
– one nonmanipulator voting · · · > B − {bi1} > p > bi1 > R > si > L,
– one nonmanipulator voting · · · > B − {bi2} > p > bi2 > R > si > L,
– one nonmanipulator voting · · · > B − {bi3} > p > bi3 > R > si > L,
– and one nonmanipulator voting · · · > B > d > R > si > ℓˆ > L.
• For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k,
– two nonmanipulators voting · · · > B − {bi} > p > R > bi > L.
• For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 2k,
– two nonmanipulators voting · · · > B > p > d > R− {ri} > ri > L.
• Two nonmanipulators voting · · · > B > R > d > L.
• Three nonmanipulators voting · · · > B > R > p > L.
• One nonmanipulator voting · · · > B > R > p > ℓˆ > L.
The votes of the nonmanipulators result in the following vetoes for each of our can-
didates. (We count vetoes since the main idea of this proof is similar to the proof of
Theorem 4.20 and since we specify enough of each of the votes to clearly show all possibil-
ities for the initial round and the runoff.) Recall that the number of vetoes contributed by
each vote in the initial round is ‖L‖+ 1.
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• p has three vetoes.
• Each candidate in S has three vetoes.
• Each candidate in B ∪R ∪ {d} has two vetoes.
• Each candidate in L has more than three vetoes.
• ℓˆ has more than three vetoes (since n ≥ 3).
Let S ′ ⊆ S be an exact cover for B. We will show that if the manipulator votes
· · · > L > {si | Si ∈ S
′} > R > d > B
then p will be a winner of the overall election. Note that the candidate set of the runoff is
C ′ = {p, d}∪B∪{si | Si 6∈ S
′}∪R and ‖C ′‖ = 2n+4k+2. Again we have a set of candidates
that is crucial to pad the votes in the runoff. Now ‖R‖ + 1 is the number of vetoes in the
runoff not unlike when ‖L‖+1 was the number of vetoes in the initial round. In the runoff,
because of the absence of the candidates in L ∪ {ℓˆ} and the candidates corresponding to
the exact cover, and because of the vote of the manipulator, the remaining candidates have
the following vetoes.
• p has four vetoes.
• Each candidate in S that participates in the runoff has four vetoes.
• Each candidate in B has four vetoes.
• Each candidate in {d} ∪R has more than four vetoes.
So, p is a winner in the runoff (even without revoting).
For the converse suppose that the manipulator votes (in the initial round and the runoff)
such that p is a winner of the overall election. We will show that this is only possible if S
has an exact cover.
Clearly, each candidate in L∪{ℓˆ} will not participate in the runoff since the manipulator
can only possibly add one additional veto to each candidate. So there is no way for any of
the candidates in B ∪R ∪ {d} to have more than three vetoes in the initial round. Let C ′
be the set of candidates that participate in the runoff. Note that C ′ = {p, d} ∪ B ∪ Ŝ ∪R,
where Ŝ ⊆ S.
If ||C ′|| < 2n + 4k + 2, then each voter vetoes at least one and at most n + 2k = ||R||
candidates in the runoff. This causes d to receive two vetoes while p receives four vetoes
from the nonmanipulators in the runoff. Since there is only one manipulator, p will not win
the runoff.
If ||C ′|| ≥ 2n + 4k + 4, then each voter vetoes at least ||R|| + 2 and certainly no more
than ||R|| + ||B|| candidates in the runoff. Note that Ŝ 6= ∅ and that every candidate in
Ŝ is vetoed four times by the nonmanipulators in the runoff while p clearly has more than
five vetoes. Since there is only one manipulator, p will not win the runoff.
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It remains to handle the case where 2n+4k+2 ≤ ||C ′|| ≤ 2n+4k+3. In this case, each
voter vetoes ||R||+1 candidates in the runoff. p has four vetoes from the nonmanipulators
in the runoff. So, every b ∈ B needs at least three vetoes from the nonmanipulators in the
runoff. The only way b can get more than two vetoes from the nonmanipulators is if for
some i, b ∈ Si and si does not participate in the runoff. It follows that S − Ŝ corresponds
to a cover for B. Since ||S − Ŝ|| ≤ k, it follows that S − Ŝ corresponds to an exact cover
for B. ❑
Theorems 4.20 and 4.25 give examples of natural unweighted systems where runoffs in-
crease the complexity of manipulation. What about the weighted case? This is harder, since
there are far fewer examples of natural weighted election systems for which manipulation is
easy. And those examples tend to be so easy that they remain easy with runoffs. For exam-
ple, weighted manipulation for scoring protocols is easy if and only if the system is Plurality
or Triviality, and those remain easy (see Theorem 4.21). Narodytska and Walsh [NW13,
Proposition 7] show that Condorcet Then Plurality with weighted votes is NP-complete
with three or more candidates. Their definition of Condorcet selects as winners the Con-
dorcet winner (i.e., the candidate that beats every other candidate in a pairwise election)
and all candidates if there is no Condorcet winner. However, it is immediate from their
proof that Condorcet-CWCM (in the definition of [NW13]) with at least three candidates
is already NP-complete, and so the second round doesn’t increase the complexity.
Narodytska and Walsh [NW13] also show that TopTwo Then Plurality with weighted
votes is NP-complete, even when restricted to three candidates. This results holds with or
without revoting. TopTwo selects the two candidates with the highest plurality scores (ties
are broken lexicographically, and the candidates are renamed so that the preferred candi-
date is lexicographically first). It is easy to see that TopTwo-CWCM-runoff and TopTwo-
CWCM-revoting are easy, since voting for p is always optimal. Now consider the election
system TopTwom, where the winner is the Majority winner (if it exists) and otherwise the
two candidates with the highest Plurality scores (ties are broken lexicographically, with the
preferred candidate viewed as being lexicographically first). TopTwom-CWCM is clearly in
P; the optimal strategy for the manipulators is to vote for p. It is easy to see that TopTwom-
CWCM-runoff is the same problem as weighted manipulation of TopTwo Then Plurality
(sometimes called Plurality with Runoff in [NW13]) and that TopTwom-CWCM-runoff is
the same problem as weighted manipulation of TopTwo Then Plurality with runoff. Thus
the following holds.
Theorem 4.26 TopTwom-CWCM is in P, while TopTwom-CWCM-runoff and TopTwom-
CWCM-revoting are each NP-complete, even when restricted to three candidates.
Is there an example of an election system that is already in the literature for which
runoffs increase the complexity of weighted manipulation? There is one known case where
weighted manipulation is easy, but in a very nontrivial way. This is Llull-CWCM, restricted
to four candidates [FHS12]. This is in contrast to Copelandα for other values of α (recall
that Llull is Copeland1), which are hard for three or more candidates [FHS08,FHS07]. The
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reason that we don’t get hardness in the same way in the case for Llull, is that we get
hardness by enforcing ties (which allows us to encode Partition), but in the case of Llull, a
tie is never better than a non-tie for making p a winner. However, if we have a second round,
it does not just matter if p wins, but also if other candidates win, since these candidates
participate in the second round. It turns out that to make candidates other than p win,
we sometimes need to enforce a tie, which allows us to encode Partition, and we get NP-
completeness. This already happens for four candidates, and so we have, in four-candidate
weighted Llull, found an example of a case where runoffs make the problem go from easy
to hard.7
Theorem 4.27 Llull-CWCM-runoff and Llull-CWCM-revoting are each NP-complete,
even when restricted to four candidates.
Proof. When looking at Llull elections, it is often convenient to think of an election as
its induced weighted majority graph. Given an election E = (C, V ), E’s induced weighted
majority graph is the directed graph that has C as its vertices and for each pair of vertices
c, d, there is an edge from c to d with weight w > 0 if c beats d by a margin of w in the
pairwise election between c and d. If we leave off the weights, we get the induced majority
graph. Note that we can determine the winners of a Llull election from its induced majority
graph.
As in Section 4.1.2, we will reduce from the well-known NP-complete problem Partition:
Given a nonempty set of positive integers k1, . . . , kt that sums to 2K, we ask if there exists
a subset that sums to K. Let C = {p, a, b, c}. Construct a set of nonmanipulators V1 such
that the induced weighted majority graph of (C, V1) looks like this:
2K
4K
4K
p a
bc
4K
4K
Such a V1 exists (since all weights have the same parity) and can be computed in
polynomial time using McGarvey’s construction [McG53]. The manipulators have weights
k1, . . . , kt. Since the total weight of the manipulators is 2K, no matter how the manipulators
vote, the induced majority graph contains the cycle p → a → b → c → p and does not
contain the edge a→ c.
If k1, . . . , kt can be partitioned into two sets of equal weight (i.e., weight K), the ma-
nipulators vote so that K of the manipulator weight votes p > b > a > c and K of the
7Runoffs do not increase the complexity for three-candidate weighted Llull, since in that case p can be
made a winner of the initial round if and only if p can be made a winner of the election with runoff. If this
were not true, there would be a candidate a such that a defeats p in their pairwise election and the winners
of the initial round are p and a. But then the score of p in the initial round is 1, and the only way p can be
a winner of the initial round is if the third candidate, b, defeats a in their pairwise election. But then b is
also a winner of the initial round.
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manipulator weight votes b > p > a > c. This gives the following induced majority graph
(drawing an undirected edge for a tie):
p a
bc
Note that all candidates have a score of 2. So, all candidates proceed to the second
round. Without revoting, all candidates win the second round. So, even without revoting
p is a winner of the election.
For the converse, suppose that p is a winner of the election. c always makes it to the
second round. If the set of candidates in the second round is {p, c} or {p, a, c}, c is the
unique winner. So, in order for p to be a winner, both p and b need to make it to the
second round. This implies that p and b tie in the first round. Consider the set of weights
of the manipulators for which p > b in the first round. This set sums to K and so we have
partition. ❑
Note that the construction above also gives a natural election system for which it is not
always better for the manipulators to put p first in the first round (although of course doing
so would be optimal in classic manipulation).
We realize that upon seeing results such as Theorems 4.20–4.21, 4.23, and 4.25–4.27 it
might be natural to wonder whether NP-hardness ofX-CWCM-runoff automatically implies
NP-hardness of X-CWCM-revoting; Theorem 4.1 however shows that no such universal
implication holds.
5 Conclusions and Open Problems
This paper has explored the relative manipulation complexity of runoff elections, with and
without revoting. We have seen that there is no general relation between the manipulation
complexity of either of those with each other or with the manipulation complexity of the
underlying election system. Sometimes revoting can even lower complexity, for example.
Yet for the natural, concrete systems we studied, runoffs and revoting runoffs never lowered
complexity and sometimes raised complexity.
Important open directions include the study of runoffs and revoting runoffs for the case
of bribery rather than manipulation, for which we have some preliminary results; seeking
to find a natural system for which the complexity of X-CWCM-runoff and X-CWCM-
revoting differ (even if one is allowed to use different first- and second-round systems, this
question is open in the literature); and the study of what role heuristics, especially in light
of Theorems 4.24 and 4.25, can play.
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